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Abstract
This paper considers a network formation model when links are potentially measured with error. We
focus on a game-theoretical model of strategic network formation with incomplete information, in which
the linking decisions depend on agents’ exogenous attributes and endogenous network characteristics. In
the presence of link misclassification, we derive moment conditions that characterize the identified set for
the preference parameters associated with homophily and network externalities. Based on the moment
equality conditions, we provide an inference method that is asymptotically valid when a single network
of many agents is observed. Finally, we apply our proposed method to study trust networks in rural
villages in southern India.
Keywords: Misclassification, Network formation models, Strategic interactions, Incomplete information
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1 Introduction
Researchers across different disciplines have documented that measurement error of links is a pervasive prob-
lem in network data (e.g., Holland and Leinhardt 1973, Moffitt 2001, Kossinets 2006, Ammermueller and Pischke
2009, Wang, Shi, McFarland, and Leskovec 2012, Angrist 2014, de Paula 2017, Advani and Malde 2018). Al-
though strategic network formation models provide essential information for learning about the creation of
linking connections and peer effects when the network of interaction is endogenous, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there has been no work addressing the effects of misclassifying links in strategic network formation
models. In this paper, we consider identification and inference in a game-theoretical model of strategic
network formation with potentially misclassified links.
We focus on a simultaneous game with imperfect information in which agents decide to form connections
to maximize their expected utility (cf. Leung 2015, and Ridder and Sheng 2015). The agents’ decisions are
interdependent since the utility attached to creating a link depends on the agents’ observed attributes and
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network characteristics through link externalities (such as reciprocity, in-degree, and transitivity statistics).
The misclassification problem will affect the link formation decisions in two different ways. First, the
binary outcome variable representing an agent’s optimal linking decision is misclassified. Second, the link
misclassification problem prevents us from directly identifying the belief system that an agent uses to predict
others’ linking decisions. In this sense, the measurement error problem occurs on the left- and right-hand
sides of the equation describing the optimal linking decisions (as shown in Lemma 1).
We propose a novel approach for analyzing network formation models, which is robust to misclassification.
Specifically, in a setup that allows for the links to be potentially misclassified, we characterize the identified
set for the structural parameters, including the preference parameters concerning homophily and network
externalities. A notable innovation in our approach is that we derive the relationship between the choice
probabilities of observed network connections and the belief system (as shown in Lemma 2). This result is
crucial in allowing us to control for the endogeneity of the equilibrium beliefs and to reduce the model to a
single-agent decision model in the presence of misclassification.
We also propose an inference method that is asymptotically valid when one network with a large number
of agents is observed. Our proposed confidence interval is computationally feasible and controls the size even
when the parameters are partially identified.
In an empirical illustration, we apply our inference method to examine trust networks in Karnataka, an
area in southern India (see Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson 2013 and Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan
2012). As a benchmark for our study, we consider the case when the network is assumed to be observed
without measurement error, and we incorporate different degrees of misclassification in which some existing
links are recorded as non-existent. This benchmark scenario corresponds to the analysis conducted by Leung
(2015). Our results suggest that, even with misclassified links, the most important determinants driving the
lending decisions of the individuals in the network are reciprocation, homophily on gender, and whether or
not the individuals are relatives. For example, when we consider a scenario with up to 50% misclassification
probability, the 95% confidence intervals proposed using our inference method are at most 50% larger in
length than the confidence intervals that ignore the measurement error problem.
Our methodology contributes to the growing econometric literature studying the strategic formation
of networks. Some recent surveys include Graham (2015), Chandrasekhar (2016), and de Paula (2017).
The network formation model considered in this paper builds on the framework of strategic interactions
with incomplete information introduced by Leung (2015) and extended by Ridder and Sheng (2015). The
analysis in our paper addresses the problems arising due to link misclassification in their models.
This paper is also related to the literature of mismeasured discrete variables, e.g., misclassified binary
outcome variable (Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton, 1998), and misclassified discrete treatment vari-
able (Mahajan, 2006; Lewbel, 2007; Chen, Hu, and Lewbel, 2008; Hu, 2008). Specifically, our approach to
misclassified links is based on Molinari (2008), which offers a general bounding strategy with misclassified
discrete variables.
There are a few papers in the literature of social interactions that have examined the presence of measure-
ment error in network data (Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2014; Kline, 2015; Lewbel, Norris, Pendakur, and Qu,
2017; de Paula, Rasul, and Souza, 2018; Hu and Lin, 2018; Lewbel, Qu, and Tang, 2019). However, the re-
sults in these papers cannot be applied directly to our framework since they have a different object of interest.
In particular, they focus primarily on studying peer effects while taking as given an exogenous network of
interactions, and they do not investigate directly the underlying process that drives the formation of links
in the network. In contrast, our paper studies the effects of link misclassification in a model of strategic
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network formation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the network formation model as
a game of incomplete information. Section 3 characterizes the identified set of the structural parameters.
Section 4 introduces an inference method based on the representation of the identified set. Sections 5 presents
an empirical application using data on trust networks in rural villages in southern India. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks. Appendix A collects all the proofs of the paper.
2 Network formation game with misclassification
We extend Leung (2015) and Ridder and Sheng (2015) to model a directed network with potentially mis-
classified links. In particular, we use a static game of incomplete information as a framework to model the
formation of a directed network. For simplicity, our approach follows Leung (2015).
Consider a network determined by a set of n agents, which we denote by Nn = {1, . . . , n}. We assume
that each pair of agents (i, j) with i, j ∈ Nn is endowed with a vector of exogenous attributes Xij ∈ Rd and
an idiosyncratic shock εij ∈ R. Let X = {Xij : i, j ∈ Nn} ∈ Xn be a profile of attributes that is common
knowledge to all the agents in the network, εi = {εij : j ∈ Nn} is a profile of idiosyncratic shocks that is
agent i’s private information, and ε = {εi : i ∈ Nn} collects all the profiles of idiosyncratic shocks.
The network is represented by an n× n adjacency matrix G∗n, where the ijth element G∗ij,n = 1 if agent
i forms a direct link to agent j and G∗ij,n = 0 otherwise. We assume that the network is directed, i.e., G
∗
ij,n
and G∗ji,n may be different. The diagonal elements are normalized to be equal to zero, i.e., G
∗
ii,n = 0. The
network G∗n is potentially misclassified and the researcher observes Gn, which is a proxy for G
∗
n.
Given the network G∗n and information (X, εi), agent i has utility
Ui(G
∗
i,n, G
∗
−i,n, X, εi) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
G∗ij,n
G∗ji,n, 1n∑
k 6=i
G∗kj,n,
1
n
∑
k 6=i,j
G∗ki,nG
∗
kj,n, X
′
ij
 β0 + εij
 ,
where G∗i,n = {G∗ij,n : j ∈ Nn}, G∗−i,n = {G∗j,n : j 6= i}, and β0 is an unknown finite dimensional vector in a
parameter space B.
Agent i’s marginal utility of forming the link G∗ij,n depends on a vector of network statistics, the profile
of exogenous attributes, and the link-specific idiosyncratic component.1 The first component in the vector
of network statistics captures the utility obtained from a reciprocated link with agent j, G∗ji,n. The second
network statistic represents the in-degree of agent j, 1n
∑
k 6=iG
∗
kj,n, which captures the utility obtained from
connecting with agents of high centrality in the network. The last network statistic captures the utility of
being connected to the same agents, 1n
∑
k 6=i,j G
∗
ki,nG
∗
kj,n. The profile of exogenous attributes captures the
preferences for homophily on observed characteristics. Finally, εij is an unobserved link-specific component
affecting agent i’s decision whether to link with agent j.
Let δi,n(X, εi) denote a generic agent i’s pure strategy, which maps the information available to agent i,
(X, εi), to an action in Gn = {0, 1}n. Let σi,n(g∗i,n | X) = Pr(δi,n(X, εi) = g∗i,n | X) be the probability that
agent i chooses g∗i,n ∈ Gn given X , and σn(X) = {σi,n(g∗i,n | X), i ∈ Nn, g∗i,n ∈ Gn}. We call σn(X) a belief
profile. Given a belief profile σn and the information (X, εi), the agent i chooses g
∗
i,n from Gn to maximize
the expected utility of Ui(g
∗
i,n, δ−i,n(X, ε−i), X, εi) given (X, εi, σn).
1For simplicity, we consider three different kinds of factors in the vector of network statistics. It is straightforward to
generalize our results to a more flexible representation as in Leung (2015).
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In an n-player game, a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium σn(X) is a belief profile that satisfies the self-
consistency condition
σi,n(g
∗
i,n | X) = Pr(δi,n(X, εi) = g∗i,n | X, σn)
for all attribute profiles X ∈ Xn, actions g∗i,n ∈ Gn, and agents i ∈ Nn, where
δi,n(X, εi) = argmax
g∗
i,n
∈Gn
E
[
Ui(g
∗
i,n, δ−i,n(X, ε−i), X, εi) | X, εi, σn
]
.
We impose the following assumptions, which are also used by Leung (2015) and Ridder and Sheng (2015).
Assumption 1. The following holds for any n,
(i) For any A1, A2 ⊂ Nn disjoint, {Xij : i, j ∈ A1} and {Xkl : k, l ∈ A2} are independent.
(ii) {εij : i, j ∈ Nn} are identically distributed with the standard normal distribution, cdf Φ, and pdf φ.
Further, {εi : i ∈ Nn} are mutually independent.
(iii) ε and X are independent.
(iv) Attributes {Xij : i, j ∈ Nn} are identically distributed with a probability mass function bounded away
from zero.
Condition (i) allows for correlation across the pairs of attributes Xij and Xkl if they have a common index
(i.e., i = k). As a consequence, the attributes across all the dyads formed by one agent may be dependent.
Condition (ii) assumes that the idiosyncratic shocks are identically distributed with known distribution.
In Appendix B, we relax this assumption and consider a semi-parametric framework. This condition also
implies that the components of εi may be arbitrarily correlated. Condition (iii) rules out the possibility of
agents learning about others’ private information from the observed profile of attributes that is common
knowledge. Condition (iv) assumes that Xij is a discrete random vector.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium for our inference method. This approach is not restrictive in a
setup where the identities of the individuals in the network are irrelevant. An equilibrium profile σn is
symmetric if σi,n(g
∗
i,n | X) = σpi(i),n(pi(g∗pi(i),n) | pi(X)) for any i ∈ Nn, g∗i,n ∈ Gn, and permutation function
pi ∈ Π.2 Given Assumption 1, Leung (2015, Theorem 1) and Ridder and Sheng (2015, Proposition 1) show
the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. The next assumption summarizes these results.
Assumption 2. For any n, the agents play a symmetric equilibrium σn, i.e., there exists {δi,n : i ∈ Nn}
such that for any i ∈ Nn the following holds: (i) G∗i,n = δi,n(X, εi), (ii) σi,n(g∗i,n | X) = Pr(δi,n(X, εi) =
g∗i,n | X, σn), (iii) δi,n(X, εi) = argmaxg∗i,n∈Gn E
[
Ui(g
∗
i,n, δ−i,n(X, ε−i), X, εi) | X, εi, σn
]
, and (iv) σn is
symmetric.
The next lemma characterizes the optimal decision rule for the formation of each link in the network.
2Define permutation functions as follows. Fix any k, l ∈ Nn, and let g∗i,n ∈ G
n. Define pikl : Nn 7→ Nn as a permutation
of the indices k and l. Specifically, it maps the index k to the index l, l to k, and i to itself for any i 6= k, l. Define piX
kl
as a
function that maps each component Xij ∈ Rd to Xpikl(i)pikl(j); pi
a
kl
as a function that permutes the kth and lth elements of any
g∗i,n ∈ G
n. Hence, piX
kl
swaps the attributes of agents k and l; and pia
kl
swaps the links G∗
ik,n
and G∗
il,n
for any i. pi(·) denotes a
generic element of Π =
{
(pikl, pi
X
kl
, pia
kl
); k, l ∈ Nn
}
. In this paper, we abuse the notation pi(·) so that it denotes any of the three
components of an element in Π.
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Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1 and 2 , G∗ij,n = 1
{
(Z∗ij,n)
′β0 + εij ≥ 0
}
, where
γ∗ij,n = E
G∗ji,n, 1n∑
k 6=i
G∗kj,n,
1
n
∑
k 6=i,j
G∗ki,nG
∗
kj,n
′ | X, σn

and
Z∗ij,n =
(
γ∗ij,n
Xij
)
.
A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that each agent makes separate linking decisions for each of her
potential links. Notice that given the misclassification problem, both the optimal action G∗ij,n and the
equilibrium beliefs about the network statistics γ∗ij,n in the optimal decision rule will be misclassified. In
other words, the misclassification problem affects both left and right-hand side variables in the optimal
decision rule.
We assume that the conditional distribution of the observed network Gn is related to that of the true
state of the network, G∗n, as follows.
Assumption 3. There are two non-negative real numbers ρ0 and ρ1 with ρ0 + ρ1 < 1 such that the fol-
lowing two statements hold for every n and every i, j, k ∈ Nn. (i) Gki,n and Gkj,n are independent given
(G∗ki,n, G
∗
kj,n, X, σn). (ii) Pr(Gij,n 6= G∗ij,n | G∗ij,n, X, σn) = ρ01{G∗ij,n = 0}+ ρ11{G∗ij,n = 1}.
Condition (i) in Assumption 3 requires that the observed linking decisions Gki,n and Gkj,n are conditional
independent given the true state of the links G∗ki,n and G
∗
kj,n, and information X, σn.
3 This condition is
required to relate the nonlinear endogenous factor 1n
∑
k 6=i,j G
∗
ki,nG
∗
kj,n to other observed network features;
Lemma 2 provides the exact statement. Condition (ii) in Assumption 3 characterizes the misclassification
probabilities. Furthermore, it states that the misclassification probabilities are conditionally independent
from the information X, σn.
4 Hausman et al. (1998) has also used Condition (ii) but in a setting of a binary
choice model with misclassification of the dependent variable.
The following statement is a key observation in our analysis, which relates the observed network statistics
γij,n to the payoff relevant network statistics γ
∗
ij,n.
Lemma 2. If Assumptions 1-3 hold, then γ∗ij,n = c(ρ0, ρ1) + C(ρ0, ρ1)γij,n for every i, j, where
γij,n = E
Gji,n, 1
n
∑
k 6=i
Gkj,n,
1
n
∑
k 6=i,j
Gki,nGkj,n,
1
n
∑
k 6=i,j
(Gki,n +Gkj,n)
′ | X, σn
 ,
and, for any r0, r1 ≥ 0 such that r0 + r1 < 1,
c(r0, r1) = −
 1 0 0 00 1 0 0
0 0 1 0


1− r0 − r1 0 0 0
0 1− r0 − r1 0 0
0 0 (1 − r0 − r1)2 r0(1− r0 − r1)
0 0 0 1− r0 − r1

−1
r0
r0
r20
r0

3The independence assumption is imposed for simplicity. It is possible to remove this condition by assuming that {εij :
i, j ∈ Nn} are i.i.d. (as in Ridder and Sheng (2015)) or by modeling the relationship between Gki,nGkj,n and G
∗
ki,n
G∗
kj,n
.
4A specification of Condition (ii) that allows the misclassification probabilities ρ0 and ρ1 to depend on the observed attributes
Xij can be analyzed within our inference method. We consider the current setup to simplify the exposition.
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C(r0, r1) =
 1 0 0 00 1 0 0
0 0 1 0


1− r0 − r1 0 0 0
0 1− r0 − r1 0 0
0 0 (1− r0 − r1)2 r0(1 − r0 − r1)
0 0 0 1− r0 − r1

−1
.
Notice that the first three components in γij,n are the observed analog to the statistics in γ
∗
ij,n since they
are determined by the observed network Gn. The last component in γij,n is the sum of the in-degrees of
agents i and j, and it is the result of controlling for the unobserved network statistics 1n
∑
k 6=i,j G
∗
ki,nG
∗
kj,n.
To be precise, the last two statistics in γij,n control for the beliefs about the unobserved network statis-
tic 1n
∑
k 6=i,j G
∗
ki,nG
∗
kj,n, which is the only nonlinear endogenous factor. The intuition behind this re-
sult is similar to the one found in polynomial regression models with mismeasured continuous covariates
(Hausman, Newey, Ichimura, and Powell, 1991).
Assumptions 1-3 imply the following relationship between the distributions of Gij,n and G
∗
ij,n, which will
be used in our identification analysis. Since we observe Gij,n in the dataset but the outcome of interest is
G∗ij,n, it is crucial to connect these two objects.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1-3, Pr(Gij,n = 1 | Xij , γij,n, γ∗ij,n) = ρ0Pr(G∗ij,n = 0 | Xij , γ∗ij,n) + (1 −
ρ1)Pr(G
∗
ij,n = 1 | Xij , γ∗ij,n).
3 Identification Analysis
We characterize the identified set based on the joint distribution P0,n of the observed variables (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n).
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In this section, we treat γij,n as observed because it can be estimated from the data as follows. For a generic
value x in the support of Xij , we can define:
pˆ(x) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
1{Xij = x}
γˆ(x) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
(
Gji,n,
1
n
∑
k Gkj,n,
1
n
∑
kGki,nGkj,n,
1
n
∑
k(Gki,n +Gkj,n)
)′
1{Xij = x}
pˆ(x)
,
where pˆ(x) is an estimator for Pr(Xij = x) and γˆij = γˆ(Xij) is an estimator for γij,n. Then we can estimate
the distribution of (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n) using the empirical distribution of (Gij,n, Xij , γˆij).
To formalize our identification analysis, we introduce the following notation. Denote by P∗ the set of
joint distributions of (Gij,n, G
∗
ij,n, Xij , γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, εij). Define the parameter space Θ = B × R, where B is
the parameter space for β0 and R is a subset of {(r0, r1) : r0, r1 ≥ 0, r0 + r1 < 1}. Denote by P the set of
joint distributions of (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n).
Given Assumptions 1-3 and based on the results summarized in Lemmas 1-3, we impose the following
three conditions on the true joint distribution P ∗0,n of the variables (Gij,n, G
∗
ij,n, Xij , γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, εij) and the
true parameter value θ0 = (β, ρ0, ρ1).
Condition 1. Under P ∗, the following holds: (i) εij is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
one. (ii) εij and (Xij , γ
∗
ij,n) are independent.
5The identified set can be characterized based on the joint distribution of {(Gij,n,Xij , γij,n) : i, j ∈ Nn}. However, it is
unfeasible to estimate the joint distribution of all the dyads in the network from a sample of n agents. Hence, the identified set
based on {(Gij,n,Xij , γij,n) : i, j ∈ Nn} is not immediately useful for inference. In contrast, P0,n can be estimated from our
current sample.
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Condition 2. G∗ij,n = 1
{
(Z∗ij,n)
′b+ εij ≥ 0
}
a.s. P ∗, where Z∗ij,n =
(
(γ∗ij,n)
′, (Xij)
′
)′
.
Condition 3. (i) P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Xij , γij,n, γ∗ij,n) = r0P ∗(G∗ij,n = 0 | Xij , γ∗ij,n) + (1 − r1)P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 |
Xij , γ
∗
ij,n). (ii) γ
∗
ij,n = c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n a.s. P
∗.
For each element P of P , we are going to define the identified set based on the three conditions above.
Definition 1. For each distribution P ∈ P, the identified set ΘI(P ) is defined as the set of all θ = (b, r0, r1)
in Θ for which there is some joint distribution P ∗ ∈ P∗ such that Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold and the
distribution of (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n) induced from P
∗ is equal to P .
Note that the definition of ΘI(P ) does not depend on n, but the identified set ΘI(P0,n) under the data
generating process P0,n can depend on the sample size when the data distribution P0,n depends on n.
Using Definition 1, we characterize the identified set as follows.
Theorem 1. Given a joint distribution P ∈ P, ΘI(P ) is equal to the set of θ ∈ Θ satisfying
EP [Gij,n | Xij , γij,n] = Ψ(θ,Xij , γij,n), (1)
where, for a generic value (x, γˇij) of (Xij , γij,n), we define
Ψ(θ, x, γˇij) = r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Φ((c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γˇij)′b1 + x′b2).
If the links were measured without error, the moment equation in Eq. (1) would degenerate into the
model in Leung (2015): EP [Gij,n − Φ([γij,n]′123b1 + X ′ijb2) | Xij , γij,n] = 0, where [γij,n]123 is a vector
composed by the first three components of γij,n.
Our characterization of the identified set in Theorem 1 relies on εij being normally distributed. In
Appendix B, we characterize the identified set in a semi-parametric framework.
4 Inference
In this section, we construct confidence intervals for θ based on the identification analysis in Theorem 1 and
derive its asymptotic coverage when we observe one single network with many agents. As in Leung (2015)
and Ridder and Sheng (2015), we use the asymptotic arguments based on a symmetric equilibrium.
We derive two confidence intervals for a prespecified significance level α ∈ (0, 1), and we suggest using
Cˆn(α) introduced in Section 4.2 rather than CIn(α) introduced in Section 4.1, because the computation
of Cˆn(α) is much less demanding. In particular, the computation of Cˆn(α) only requires us to calculate
the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator and its confidence interval for the grid values of (r0, r1). On the
other hand, the computation of CIn(α) would require us to evaluate the test statistic that characterizes the
confidence interval at every value of θ = (b, r0, r1), and therefore the computational cost of CIn(α) can be
exponential in the number of the (exogenous and endogenous) regressors.
4.1 Confidence Interval through Test Inversion
Consider the unconditional sample analog of the moment condition in Eq. (1):
mˆn(θ) = mˆn(b, r0, r1) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n −Ψ(θ,Xij , γˆij)) ζij ,
7
where x1, . . . , xJ are all the support points for Xij and ζij = (1{Xij = x1}, . . . , 1{Xij = xJ})′. Notice that
mˆn is different from the infeasible sample moment
mn(θ) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n −Ψ(θ,Xij , γij,n)) ζij ,
because γij,n is estimable but unknown. We estimate the variance of mˆn(θ) by
Sˆ(θ) = Sˆ(b, r0, r1) =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψˆi(θ)ψˆi(θ)
′ −
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψˆi(θ)
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψˆi(θ)
)′)
,
where ψˆi(θ) denotes the estimated influence function of mˆn(θ):
ψˆi(θ) =
1
n
∑
j 6=i
Gij,nζij − 1
n2
∑
l,j
 ∂
∂γˇ′lj
Ψ(θ,Xlj , γˇlj)
∣∣∣∣∣
γˇlj=γˆlj,n
 ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)ζlj .
The component ψˆγ,i,n(x) in ψˆi(θ) denotes the estimated influence function of the first stage estimator γˆij :
ψˆγ,k,n(x) =
1
n2
∑
i1,j1
1{Xi1,j1 = x}
pˆ(x)

0
Gkj1
Gki1Gkj1
Gki1 +Gkj1
+ 1n
∑
i1
1{Xi1,k = x}
pˆ(x)

Gki1
0
0
0
 .
We construct a confidence interval for θ as:
CIn(α) = {θ ∈ Θ : nmˆn(θ)′Sˆ(θ)−1mˆn(θ) ≤ q(χ2J , 1− α)},
where q(χ2J , 1 − α) is the (1 − α) quantile of a χ2 distribution with J degrees of freedom. The degrees of
freedom are determined by the number of points in the support of Xij .
The following theorem demonstrates the asymptotic coverage for the confidence interval CIn(α).
Theorem 2. Suppose that (i) the minimum eigenvalue of V ar(ψi(θ0) | X, σn) is bounded away from zero,
and (ii) lim inf minx pˆ(x) > 0. Under Assumptions 1-3,
lim inf
n→∞
Pr(θ0 ∈ CIn(α) | X, σn) ≥ 1− α.
Condition (i) guarantees that Sˆ(θ) is non-singular. A similar condition is used in Leung (2015, Theorem
3). Condition (ii) is required to ensure uniform consistency of the first-stage estimator γˆij .
4.2 Confidence Interval based on Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator
In this section, we construct a more computationally feasible (but potentially larger) confidence interval
for β. In addition to the assumptions in the previous section, we assume that {((γ∗ij,n)′, X ′ij)′ : i, j} is not
contained in any proper linear subspace of Rd+3. By this assumption, the parameter β0 would be identified
if we knew the true value of (ρ0, ρ1).
6
6The exact statement and its proof are found in Lemma 12 in the appendix.
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If we knew (ρ0, ρ1) = (r0, r1) for a given value (r0, r1) ∈ R, we could construct a confidence inter-
val Cn(α; r0, r1) for β by computing the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator βˆ(r0, r1) and its estimated
asymptotic variance ÂV (r0, r1) in the following way. We consider the following quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator:
βˆ(r0, r1) = argmax
b∈B
Qˆn(b, r0, r1)
where the feasible objective function is:
Qˆn(b, r0, r1) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
log
(
Ψ(b, r0, r1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))
Gij,n(1−Ψ(b, r0, r1, Xij , γˆ(Xij)))1−Gij,n
)
.
Define the estimated influence function of Qˆn(b, r0, r1) by
ψˆQ,k,n(θ) =
1
n
∑
j
(Gkj,n −Ψ(θ,Xkj , γˆ(Xkj)))C1(θ,Xij , γˆ(Xkj))
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Ψ(θ,Xij , γˆ(Xij))D1(θ,Xij , γˆ(Xij))−D2(θ,Xij , γˆ(Xij))) ψˆγ,k,n(Xij),
where
C1(θ,Xij , γˇij) =
∂
∂bΨ(θ,Xij , γˇij)
Ψ(θ,Xij , γˇij)(1 −Ψ(θ,Xij , γˇij))
C2(θ,Xij , γˇij) =
∂
∂bΨ(θ,Xij , γˇij)
1−Ψ(θ,Xij , γˇij)
D1(θ,Xij , γˇij) =
∂
∂γˇ′ij
C1(θ,Xij , γˇij)
D2(θ,Xij , γˇij) =
∂
∂γˇ′ij
C2(θ,Xij , γˇij).
The asymptotic variance for βˆ(r0, r1) is estimated by:
ÂV (r0, r1) =
(
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qˆn(b, r0, r1)
∣∣∣∣
b=βˆ(r0,r1)
)−1(
1
n
n∑
k=1
ψˆQ,k,n(βˆ(r0, r1), r0, r1)ψˆQ,k,n(βˆ(r0, r1), r0, r1)
′
)
×
(
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qˆn(b, r0, r1)
∣∣∣∣
b=βˆ(r0,r1)
)−1
,
and a confidence interval for β is:
Cn(α; r0, r1) =
{
b ∈ B : n(βˆ(r0, r1)− b)′ÂV (r0, r1)−1(βˆ(r0, r1)− b) ≤ q(χ2d+3, 1− α)
}
,
where q(χ2d+3, 1− α) is the (1− α) quantile of a χ2 distribution with d+ 3 degrees of freedom.7
7We can construct a confidence interval for a subvector η′β of a given vector η:
η′βˆ(r0, r1)± q(N(0, 1), 1− α/2)
√
η′ÂV (r0, r1)η
n
where q(N(0, 1), 1−α/2) is the (1−α/2) quantile of the standard normal distribution. In the same way as β, we can also take
the union over (r0, r1) ∈ R and construct a feasible confidence interval for η′β.
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Since we do not know the true value of (ρ0, ρ1), we construct a confidence interval for β by taking the
union of Cn(α; r0, r1) over (r0, r1) ∈ R:
Cˆn(α) =
⋃
(r0,r1)∈R
Cn(α; r0, r1).
This confidence interval contains the true parameter value with correct asymptotic size. The next theorem
formalizes this result.
Theorem 3. Suppose that (i) lim inf minx pˆ(x) > 0, (ii) β0 is in the interior of a compact subset B of the
Euclidean space, (iii) {((γ∗ij,n)′, X ′ij)′ : i, j} is not contained in any proper linear subspace of Rd+3, and (iv)
the minimum eigenvalue of E
[
1
n
∑n
k=1 ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n
]
is bounded away from zero, where:
ψQ,k,n =
1
n
∑
j
(Gkj,n −Ψ(θ0, Xkj , γkj,n))C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
(E [Gij,n | X, σn]D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D2(θ0, Xij , γij,n))ψγ,k,n(Xij).
Under Assumptions 1-3,
lim inf
n→∞
Pr(β0 ∈ Cˆn(α) | X, σn) ≥ 1− α.
Condition (i) is required to ensure uniform consistency of the first-stage estimator γˆij . Condition (ii) is
a regularity condition and is used to derive the asymptotic distribution of βˆ(ρ0, ρ1). Condition (iii) is a rank
condition and guarantees that β0 is the unique maximizer of the limiting objective function. This assumption
guarantees that the equilibrium beliefs about the network statistics γ∗ij,n have sufficient exogenous variations
for any finite n. Condition (iv) ensures that ÂV (ρ0, ρ1) is asymptotically invertible.
The size property of Cˆn(α) in Theorem 3 follows from:
√
n(ÂV (ρ0, ρ1))
−1/2(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1)− β0)→d N(0, I), (2)
because Pr(β0 ∈ Cˆn(α) | X, σn) ≥ Pr(β0 ∈ Cn(α; ρ0, ρ1) | X, σn). Although Eq. (2) is proved in a similar
manner to Leung (2015, Theorem 3), it is not a direct implication of Leung (2015, Theorem 3) since we do
not directly observe the true underlying network G∗n.
5 Empirical Illustration
In this section, we implement the confidence interval introduced in Section 4.2 using data on social networks
from 75 rural villages in southern India. In particular, we investigate the robustness of the empirical results in
Leung (2015) to the presence of misclassified links. The data was collected in 2006 to study the introduction of
a microfinance program (see Banerjee et al. 2013 and Jackson et al. 2012). This dataset contains household
characteristics that were collected using full village censuses, and individual and network data that were
obtained using follow-up surveys conducted on random samples of individuals in each village.
Among the different dimensions of social relationships contained in the dataset, we follow Leung (2015)
and focus on trust networks. These networks measure the individuals’ willingness to lend money. The direct
links observed in our dataset are obtained from using the following survey question: “Who do you trust
enough that if he/she needed to borrow Rs. 50 for a day you would lend it to him/her?”
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
mean sd min max
# villagers 225.667 67.446 98.000 303.000
in-degree 0.951 1.275 0 10
out-degree 0.951 0.807 0 4
average age 38.470 1.405 35.775 40.599
share female 0.561 0.016 0.547 0.592
share Hindu 0.793 0.106 0.581 0.918
share OBC 0.621 0.133 0.429 0.762
share scheduled 0.295 0.085 0.206 0.439
Jackson et al. (2012) discuss concerns about measurement error issues that might be present in this
dataset. Potential sources include (i) individuals forgetting to mention connections, (ii) people getting
fatigued by interviews, and (iii) top-censoring the number of social connections that individuals could report.8
Under the structure of the survey questions, which ask individuals about actual actions (such as lending
or borrowing money) rather than perceived relationships, individuals are more likely to forget existing
interactions than to imagine non-existent ones. Hence, the most likely type of measurement error to appear
in this dataset is the misclassification of true links as non-existent (i.e., false negative). Therefore, in this
empirical illustration, we focus on the false-negative case. For completeness, we consider the false-positive
case at the end of the empirical application.
We examine the relative importance that homophily on observed attributes and endogenous beliefs about
trustworthiness have in the formation of trust networks. Regarding the preferences for homophily, we study
homophily relations on gender, caste, language, religion, and family relationships. The villages are primarily
homogeneous in language and religion but heterogeneous in caste. In terms of religion, Hinduism represents
the large majority. Due to multicollinearity concerns and in order to study homophily on religion, we restrict
our sample to 9 villages where the non-Hindu minorities have at least a 10% representation. The total sample
then consists of 2, 031 individuals in those 9 villages.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the observed attributes.9 The average number of individuals
across the 9 villages is 225, where the largest network has 303 individuals. The average degree across the 9
networks is equal to 0.951. The largest in-degree value observed for an individual within our sample is equal
to 10, which means that, at least in one case, ten people in our sample listed a specific individual as someone
to whom they would be willing to lend money. Meanwhile, the maximum out-degree observed across the 9
networks is equal to 4. In other words, the maximum number of people to whom a single individual within
our sample was willing to lend money is equal to 4. On average, 56% percent of the individuals surveyed
are female and 79.8% Hindu. The religious minorities, composed of Christians and Muslims, are aggregated
into a general non-Hindu category. Scheduled castes are at the bottom of the hierarchy and represent 62%
of the sample. OBC castes are second to bottom and account for 29%. The remaining 8.4% is composed of
different castes that are aggregated into a general category at the top of the hierarchy.
The direct link Gij,n, for any distinct individuals i and j, is recorded to be equal to 1 if individual i lists
j as someone to whom he or she is willing to lend Rs. 50, and 0 otherwise. Notice that we allow for Gij,n to
8Network subsampling is an interesting and challenging setting that is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, we assume
that we observe the full list of nodes in the networks.
9Hindu is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent reports being Hindu and equal to 0 if he or she reports being
Christian or Muslim. Scheduled and OBC castes are respectively the bottom and second to bottom caste of the hierarchy. The
remaining castes are aggregated into a general category at the top of the hierarchy.
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be potentially misclassified. In the vector of observed attributes Xij , we include individual i- and individual
j-specific regressors, such as age, caste, gender, religion, and an indicator for whether or not i and j are
heads of their household, as well as the controls for homophily described above.
In the vector of endogenous network statistics γ∗ij,n, we consider the conditional expectation of the
following factors: (i) G∗ji,n, which accounts for the value of reciprocation; (ii) n
−1
∑
k 6=iG
∗
kj,n, which measures
the share of people willing to lend money to j; and (iii) n−1
∑
k 6=i,j G
∗
ki,nG
∗
kj,n, which is the supported trust
or share of individuals that are willing to lend to both i and j. We account for the misclassification on
the endogenous network statistics via Lemma 2. As a first stage estimator, we use the frequency estimator
described in Section 3.
In order to examine the effects of potentially misclassified links on the estimation of the structural
parameters of a network formation model, we allow for the possibility of missing links to exist in the true
underlying network. In particular, we consider six scenarios for the probability of misclassifying a link as
missing when it is present in the true underlying network, i.e., r1 ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}. Given that we
focus on false negatives, we assume that r0 = 0, i.e., the links that are not present in the true underlying
network are not misclassified. Consequently, by setting r0 = 0 and r1 = 0, we can analyze the scenario when
there is no measurement error in the network. This scenario corresponds to the empirical analysis in Leung
(2015), and we use it as our baseline case.10
Table 2 presents 95% confidence intervals for the estimates of the network statistics, the homophily
parameters, and the constant term. Point estimates are reported in Table 3. Column 1 of Table 2 presents
the confidence intervals for the “no misclassification” case, i.e., r0 = r1 = 0. These results indicate that
reciprocation is an important endogenous factor in determining the willingness of an individual to lend money.
In other words, an individual within the network is more willing to lend money to someone else if that trust
is reciprocated. There is also evidence that individuals present preferences for homophily on gender and for
being close relatives when lending money to another individual. There is no conclusive evidence regarding
the relative importance of the remaining covariates considered in the specification for the network formation
model.
Columns 2 to 6 of Table 2 present 95% confidence intervals for the parameter estimates under different
misclassification probabilities, r1 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}. Reciprocation and homophily on gender and
family relationships remain significant factors driving the formation of a link on trust networks. Most of
the confidence intervals become wider as the size of the measurement error problem becomes more pervasive
in the data. Nonetheless, this increase remains relatively small for the cases of misclassification considered.
Table 4 provides further evidence about this insight.
In Table 4, we compare the length of 95% confidence intervals that take misclassification into account,
with the length of the confidence intervals computed under the assumption of no measurement error, i.e.,
|Cˆn(α)|/|Cn(α, 0, 0)|. Given a misclassification probability of up to 10%, the coefficient for reciprocation
presents the largest increase in interval length, which is 7.9% larger than the baseline confidence interval.
With a misclassification probability of up to 30%, the largest increase in the length of the confidence intervals
is 24.3% larger than the confidence intervals that do not take measurement error into account. Finally, at
the extreme case of at most 50% misclassification probability, the largest increase in the length of confidence
intervals is 49.8% of the benchmark confidence intervals, and the second-largest increase is 26%.
Overall, this empirical illustration suggests that reciprocation, homophily on gender, and family relation-
10Unlike the empirical specification in Leung (2015), we do not include in-degree or out-degree statistics weighted by caste
or religion as part of the factors that capture network externalities.
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ships are the most important factors driving the lending decisions of the individuals in the network. These
results are robust to the misclassification of existent links as non-existent in network data. Furthermore, we
use different scenarios for the misclassification probabilities to compare the length of 95% confidence intervals
computed under our method to the length of confidence intervals that assume no measurement error. The
analysis suggests that with a misclassification probability of up to 50%, the 95% confidence intervals are at
most 49.8% larger than the length of the baseline confidence intervals.
5.1 Alternative Design: False Positives
As an alternative design, we consider the case when non-existent links are misclassified as existent (i.e., false
positives). In particular, we consider r0 ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2} and r1 = 0. Table 5 presents 95% confidence
intervals for the estimates of the parameters of interest. In Column 1 of Table 5, we report the confidence
intervals for the “no misclassification” case to simplify comparisons. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 5 present
95% confidence intervals for the parameter estimates under r0 ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2}. At a 5% misclassification
probability, reciprocation is no longer a significant factor in explaining the formation of links on trust
networks. Homophily on gender loses significance at a 10% misclassification probability, and none of the
factors considered are significant at a 20% misclassification probability.
Table 6 compares the length of 95% confidence intervals that take misclassification of non-existent links
into account with the length of the confidence intervals computed under the assumption of no measurement
error. The evidence suggests that even at 5% small misclassification probability, the confidence intervals can
be 65% wider in length than the baseline confidence intervals. The length of the confidence intervals can be
severely affected by 10% and higher misclassification probabilities. These results suggest that the estimates
of the parameters in the network formation model might be sensitive to misclassifying non-existent links as
real links, even at small probabilities. One explanation behind these outcomes could be the sparsity of the
networks considered in our empirical application. In other words, due to the reduced number of links formed
in the network, the effects of misclassifying links are asymmetric and more pervasive for the false-positive
case.
6 Conclusion
We study a network formation model with potentially misclassified links. Specifically, we focus on a strategic
game of network formation with incomplete information. We propose a novel approach for analyzing network
formation models, which is robust to misclassification. In particular, we characterize the identified set for the
structural parameters, including the preference parameters concerning homophily and network externalities.
Based on the identification result, we develop an inference method which is asymptotically valid when a
single large network is available. We apply the proposed inference method to examine trust networks in Kar-
nataka, India. Using different scenarios for the misclassification probabilities, our 95% confidence intervals
demonstrate the statistical significance of the key factors driving the lending decisions of the individuals in
the network.
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Table 2: 95% Confidence intervals Cˆn(α) with n = 2, 031 and r0 = 0
r1 = 0 r1 ≤ 0.1 r1 ≤ 0.2 r1 ≤ 0.3 r1 ≤ 0.4 r1 ≤ 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reciprocation [0.833, 2.184] [0.727, 2.184] [0.618, 2.184] [0.505, 2.184] [0.365, 2.184] [0.160, 2.184]
In degree [-60.108, 119.573] [-60.108, 119.573] [-60.108, 119.573] [-60.108, 119.573] [-60.108, 119.573] [-60.108, 119.573]
Supported trust [-133.290, 302.937] [-133.290, 302.937] [-133.290, 302.937] [-133.290, 302.937] [-133.290, 302.937] [-133.290, 302.937]
Constant [-11.073, 3.641] [-11.153, 3.776] [-11.240, 3.919] [-11.350, 4.089] [-11.502, 4.311] [-11.722, 4.612]
Same religion [-0.147, 0.987] [-0.149, 0.998] [-0.152, 1.012] [-0.155, 1.030] [-0.158, 1.053] [-0.166, 1.087]
Same sex [0.481, 0.789] [0.481, 0.803] [0.481, 0.817] [0.481, 0.830] [0.481, 0.846] [0.481, 0.868]
Same caste [-0.136, 0.641] [-0.147, 0.659] [-0.159, 0.680] [-0.174, 0.704] [-0.191, 0.734] [-0.211, 0.770]
Same language [-0.792, 0.860] [-0.810, 0.878] [-0.832, 0.898] [-0.857, 0.922] [-0.889, 0.953] [-0.932, 0.993]
Same family [0.303, 2.541] [0.303, 2.617] [0.303, 2.681] [0.303, 2.741] [0.303, 2.828] [0.303, 2.975]
1
4
Table 3: Estimates for the parameter coefficients given a value of r1
r1 = 0 r1 = 0.1 r1 = 0.2 r1 = 0.3 r1 = 0.4 r1 = 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reciprocation 1.509 1.444 1.367 1.277 1.176 1.066
(0.345) (0.366) (0.382) (0.394) (0.414) (0.462)
In degree 29.733 27.202 24.673 22.114 19.508 16.837
(45.838) (42.387) (38.823) (35.174) (31.439) (27.606)
Supported trust 84.823 73.997 61.288 49.072 37.911 27.995
(111.285) (92.788) (75.330) (59.840) (46.266) (34.573)
Constant -3.716 -3.688 -3.661 -3.630 -3.595 -3.555
(3.753) (3.808) (3.867) (3.939) (4.034) (4.167)
Same religion 0.420 0.424 0.430 0.438 0.447 0.461
(0.289) (0.293) (0.297) (0.302) (0.309) (0.319)
Same sex 0.635 0.645 0.657 0.669 0.684 0.701
(0.078) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.085)
Same caste 0.252 0.256 0.260 0.265 0.272 0.279
(0.198) (0.206) (0.214) (0.224) (0.236) (0.250)
Same language 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.031
(0.421) (0.431) (0.441) (0.454) (0.470) (0.491)
Same family 1.422 1.488 1.559 1.637 1.724 1.828
(0.571) (0.576) (0.572) (0.563) (0.563) (0.585)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Sample size is n = 2, 031.
Table 4: Ratio of lengths of 95% confidence intervals, |Cˆn(α)|/|Cn(α, 0, 0)|, with n = 2, 031
r1 ≤ 0.1 r1 ≤ 0.2 r1 ≤ 0.3 r1 ≤ 0.4 r1 ≤ 0.5
(1) (2) (3)) (4) (5)
Reciprocation 1.079 1.159 1.243 1.347 1.498
In degree 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Supported trust 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Constant 1.015 1.030 1.049 1.075 1.110
Same religion 1.013 1.028 1.045 1.069 1.105
Same sex 1.046 1.089 1.134 1.186 1.256
Same caste 1.038 1.080 1.130 1.190 1.262
Same language 1.022 1.047 1.077 1.115 1.165
Same family 1.034 1.062 1.089 1.128 1.194
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Table 5: 95% Confidence intervals Cˆn(α) with n = 2, 031 and r1 = 0
r0 = 0 r0 ≤ 0.05 r0 ≤ 0.1 r0 ≤ 0.2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reciprocation [0.833, 2.184] [-0.056, 2.184] [-0.415, 2.184] [-0.415, 2.184]
In degree [-60.107, 119.567] [-71.059, 119.567] [-71.059, 119.567] [-71.059, 119.567]
Supported trust [-133.213, 302.953] [-133.213, 302.953] [-133.213, 302.953] [-133.213, 302.953]
Constant [-11.072, 3.640] [-11.072, 3.640] [-11.072, 3.640] [-11.072, 3.640]
Same religion [-0.147, 0.986] [-2.076, 0.986] [-5.939, 0.986] [-5.939, 0.986]
Same sex [0.481, 0.789] [0.124, 1.257] [-0.205, 4.160] [-0.425, 4.160]
Same caste [-0.136, 0.641] [-1.019, 0.968] [-1.019, 1.777] [-1.019, 1.777]
Same language [-0.792, 0.860] [-0.792, 0.860] [-0.792, 0.860] [-0.792, 0.860]
Same family [0.303, 2.541] [0.303, 6.223] [0.303, 10.519] [-0.359, 10.519]
1
6
Table 6: Ratio of lengths of 95% confidence intervals, |Cˆn(α)|/|Cn(α, 0, 0)|, with n = 2, 031
r0 ≤ 0.05 r0 ≤ 0.1 r0 ≤ 0.2
(1) (2) (3))
Reciprocation 1.658 1.924 1.924
In degree 1.061 1.061 1.061
Supported trust 1.000 1.000 1.000
Constant 1.000 1.000 1.000
Same religion 2.703 6.113 6.113
Same sex 3.680 14.187 14.904
Same caste 2.558 3.600 3.600
Same language 1.000 1.000 1.000
Same family 2.645 4.565 4.860
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemmas in Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. By Assumption 2,
G∗i,n = argmax
g∗
i,n
∈Gn
E
[
Ui(g
∗
i,n, G
∗
−i,n, X, εi) | X, εi, σn
]
= argmax
g∗
i,n
∈Gn
1
n
n∑
j=1
g∗ij,n
[
(Z∗ij,n)
′β0 + εij
]
.
Therefore, G∗ij,n = 1
{
(Z∗ij,n)
′β0 + εij ≥ 0
}
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Define
D(r0, r1) =

1− r0 − r1 0 0 0
0 1− r0 − r1 0 0
0 0 (1− r0 − r1)2 r0(1− r0 − r1)
0 0 0 1− r0 − r1
 .
By Assumption 3, we can derive:
E [Gki,nGkj,n | X, σn] = ρ20 + (1 − ρ0 − ρ1)2E
[
G∗ki,nG
∗
kj,n | X, σn
]
+ ρ0(1− ρ0 − ρ1)E
[
G∗ki,n +G
∗
kj,n | X, σn
]
.
Therefore:
γij,n =

E [Gji,n | X, σn]
1
n
∑
k E [Gkj,n | X, σn]
1
n
∑
k E [Gki,nGkj,n | X, σn]
1
n
∑
k E [Gki,n +Gkj,n | X, σn]

=

ρ0
ρ0
ρ20
ρ0
+D(ρ0, ρ1)

E
[
G∗ji,n | X, σn
]
1
n
∑
k E
[
G∗kj,n | X, σn
]
1
n
∑
k E
[
G∗ki,nG
∗
kj,n | X, σn
]
1
n
∑
k E
[
G∗ki,n +G
∗
kj,n | X, σn
]
 .
Since D(ρ0, ρ1) is invertible given 1− ρ0 − ρ1 6= 0, it follows that:
E
[
G∗ji,n | X
]
1
n
∑
k E
[
G∗kj,n | X, σn
]
1
n
∑
k E
[
G∗ki,nG
∗
kj,n | X, σn
]
1
n
∑
k E
[
G∗ki,n +G
∗
kj,n | X, σn
]
 = D(ρ0, ρ1)−1
γij,n −

ρ0
ρ0
ρ20
ρ0

 .
The first three components of the right-hand side of the above equation are: γ∗ij,n, so
γ∗ij,n =
 1 0 0 00 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
D(ρ0, ρ1)−1
γij,n −

ρ0
ρ0
ρ20
ρ0

 = c(ρ0, ρ1) + C(ρ0, ρ1)γij,n.
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Proof of Lemma 3. It suffices to show that Pr(Gij,n = 1 | Xij , γij,n, γ∗ij,n, X, σn) = ρ0Pr(G∗ij,n = 0 |
Xij , γ
∗
ij,n) + (1 − ρ1)Pr(G∗ij,n = 1 | Xij , γ∗ij,n). Since (Xij , γij,n, γ∗ij,n) are a function of (X, σn), it follows
that:
Pr(Gij,n = 1 | Xij , γij,n, γ∗ij,n, X, σn) = Pr(Gij,n = 1 | X, σn).
Using Assumptions 1-3:
Pr(Gij,n = 1 | X, σn) = ρ0Pr(G∗ij,n = 0 | X, σn) + (1− ρ1)Pr(G∗ij,n = 1 | X, σn)
= ρ0Pr((Z
∗
ij,n)
′b + εij < 0 | X, σn) + (1− ρ1)Pr((Z∗ij,n)′b+ εij ≥ 0 | X, σn)
= ρ0Pr((Z
∗
ij,n)
′b + εij < 0 | Z∗ij,n) + (1− ρ1)Pr((Z∗ij,n)′b+ εij ≥ 0 | Z∗ij,n),
where the first equality follows from Assumption 3, the second follows from Lemma 1, and the last follows
from the independence between ε and X .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. To show that every element θ of ΘI(P ) satisfies Eq. (1), we can derive the following equalities:
P (Gij,n = 1 | Xij , γij,n) = P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Xij , γij,n)
= P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Xij , γij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | Xij , γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)P ∗((Z∗ij,n)′b+ εij ≥ 0 | Xij , γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Φ((γ∗ij,n)′b1 +X ′ijb2)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Φ((c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n)′b1 +X ′ijb2),
where the first equality follows from P = P ∗ for the observables (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n), the second equality follows
because γ∗ij,n is a function of γij,n in Condition 3(ii), the third equality follows from Condition 3(i), the fourth
equality follows from Condition 2, the fifth equality follows from Condition 1, and the last equality follows
from Condition 3(ii). The rest of the proof will show that every element θ of Θ satisfying Eq. (1) belongs
to ΘI(P ).
Define the joint distribution P ∗ in the following way. The marginal distribution of εij is standard normal.
The conditional distribution of (γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij) given εij is
P ∗((γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij) ∈ B | εij) = P ((γij,n, c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n, Xij) ∈ B) (3)
for all the measurable sets B. The conditional distribution of G∗ij,n given (γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij , εij) is:
P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | γij,n, γ∗ij,n, Xij , εij) = 1{(Z∗ij,n)′b+ εij ≥ 0}. (4)
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The conditional distribution of Gij,n given (G
∗
ij,n, γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij , εij) is:
P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | G∗ij,n, γij,n, γ∗ij,n, Xij , εij) =
r0 if G∗ij,n = 01− r1 if G∗ij,n = 1. (5)
Note that (P ∗, θ) satisfies Conditions 1-3, because Condition 1(i) follows because εij is normally dis-
tributed under P ∗, Condition 1(ii) follows from Eq. (3). Condition 2 follows from Eq. (4). Condition 3(i)
follows from Eq. (4) and (5), and Condition 3(ii) follows from Eq. (3).
The distribution of (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n) induced from P
∗ is equal to P . The distribution of (Xij , γij,n)
induced from P ∗ is equal to that from P , by the construction of P ∗((γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij) ∈ B | εij). The equality
of P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n) = P (Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n) a.s. under P ∗ is shown as follows. Note that:
γ∗ij,n = c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n a.s. under P
∗. (6)
Then:
P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n) = P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0P
∗(G∗ij,n = 0 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n) + (1− r1)P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)EP∗ [P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n, εij) | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n]
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)P ∗((Z∗ij,n)′b+ εij ≥ 0 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Φ((Z∗ij,n)′b)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Φ((c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n)′b1 +X ′ijb2)
= P (Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n),
where the first and seventh equalities follow from Eq. (6), the second follows from Eq. (5), the fifth follows
from Eq. (4), and the last follows from Eq. (1).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 follows because Lemma 10 and 11 in this appendix imply that, conditional on (X, σn), nmˆn(θ)
′Sˆ(θ)−1mˆn(θ)
converges in distribution to the χ2J distribution.
In the proof of this theorem, all the statements are conditional on (X, σn). For any vector, the norm is
understood as the Euclidean norm, and for any matrix the norm is induced by the Euclidean norm.
Define:
uij(θ) = (c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n)
′b1 +X
′
ijb2
uˆij(θ) = (c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γˆij,n)
′b1 +X
′
ijb2.
For a generic random variable RV, define:
RV † = RV − E[RV | X, σn],
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and note that E[RV † | X, σn] = 0. Define:
ψγ,k,n(x) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
(
1{Xi,j = x}
pˆ(x)
)
0
G†kj,n
(Gki,nGkj,n)
†
(Gki,n +Gkj,n)
†
+ 1n
∑
i
(
1{Xi,k = x}
pˆ(x)
)
G†ki,n
0
0
0

ψk(θ0) =
1
n
∑
j 6=k
(Gkj,n − ρ0 − (1− ρ0 − ρ1)Φ(ukj(θ0))) ζkj
−(1− ρ0 − ρ1) 1
n2
∑
i,j
(φ(ukj(θ0))β
′
1C(ρ0, ρ1)ψγ,k,n(Xij)) ζij
ψ˜k(θ0) =
1
n
∑
j 6=k
Gkj,nζkj − (1− ρ0 − ρ1) 1
n2
∑
i,j
(
φ(uij(θ0))β
′
1C(ρ0, ρ1)ψˆγ,k,n(Xij)
)
ζij .
Lemma 4.
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}

E[G∗j1i1,n | X, σn]− E[G∗ji,n | X, σn]
1
n
∑
k(E[G
∗
kj1 ,n
| X, σn]− E[G∗kj,n | X, σn])
1
n
∑
k(E[G
∗
ki1,n
G∗kj1,n | X, σn]− E[G∗ki,nG∗kj,n | X, σn])
1
n
∑
k
(
E
[
G∗ki1,n +G
∗
kj1,n
| X, σn
]
− E
[
G∗ki,n +G
∗
kj,n | X, σn
])
 = 0. (7)
Proof. This result follows from symmetry of the equilibrium and it is shown in a similar way to Lemma 1 in
Leung (2015).
Lemma 5.
max{‖ψˆγ,k,n(Xij)‖, ‖ψγ,k,n(Xij)‖} ≤ 4
minx pˆ(x)
max
i
{‖ψ˜i(θ0)‖, ‖ψˆi(θ0)‖, ‖ψi(θ0)‖} ≤ 1 + (1− ρ0 − ρ1)φ(0)‖β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)‖
4
minx pˆ(x)
.
Proof. The bound for ‖ψˆγ,k,n(Xij)‖ is derived from
‖ψˆγ,k,n(x)‖ ≤ 1
n2
∑
i1,j1
1{Xi1,j1 = x}
pˆ(x)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

0
Gkj1
Gki1Gkj1
Gki1 +Gkj1

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
+
1
n
∑
i1
1{Xi1,k = x}
pˆ(x)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

Gki1
0
0
0

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
√
6
minx pˆ(x)
+
1
minx pˆ(x)
≤ 4
minx pˆ(x)
.
The bound for ‖ψγ,k,n(Xij)‖ is similarly derived.
The bound for ‖ψ˜i(θ)‖ is derived from
‖ψ˜i(θ)‖ ≤ max
j 6=i
|Gij,n|+max
l,j
∣∣∣φ(ulj(θ0))β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)∣∣∣
≤ 1 + (1− ρ0 − ρ1)φ(0)‖β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)‖
4
minx pˆ(x)
.
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The bound for ‖ψˆi(θ)‖ is similarly derived.
The bound for ‖ψi(θ)‖ is derived from:
‖ψi(θ0)‖ ≤ max
j 6=i
|Gij,n − ρ0 − (1− ρ0 − ρ1)Φ(uij(θ0))|
+(1− ρ0 − ρ1)max
l,j
‖φ(uij(θ0))β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)‖‖ψγ,i,n(Xlj)‖
≤ 1 + (1− ρ0 − ρ1)φ(0)‖β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)‖
4
minx pˆ(x)
.
Lemma 6.
γˆij − γij,n = 1
n
∑
k
ψγ,k,n(Xij)
and
sup
i,j
‖γˆij − γij,n‖ = Op(n−1/2) given (X, σn).
Proof. First, from Lemma 4 and Assumption 3, we can derive:
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}

E[Gj1i1,n | X, σn]− E[Gji,n | X, σn]
1
n
∑
k(E[Gkj1 ,n | X, σn]− E[Gkj,n | X, σn])
1
n
∑
k(E[Gki1,nGkj1,n | X, σn]− E[Gki,nGkj,n | X, σn])
1
n
∑
k(E[(Gki1,n +Gkj1,n) | X, σn]− E[(Gki,n +Gkj,n) | X, σn])
 = 0. (8)
Using Eq. (8), we have:
γˆij − γij,n = 1
n2
∑
i1,j1
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}
1
n2
∑
i1,j1
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}

Gj1i1,n − E[Gji,n | X, σn]
1
n
∑
k(Gkj1,n − E[Gkj,n | X, σn])
1
n
∑
k(Gki1 ,nGkj1,n − E[Gki,nGkj,n | X, σn])
1
n
∑
k((Gki1 ,n +Gkj1,n)− E[(Gki,n +Gkj,n) | X, σn])

=
1
n2
∑
i1,j1
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}
1
n2
∑
i1,j1
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}

G†j1i1,n
1
n
∑
kG
†
kj1,n
1
n
∑
k(Gki1 ,nGkj1,n)
†
1
n
∑
k((Gki1 ,n +Gkj1,n))
†

=
1
n
∑
k
ψγ,k,n(Xij).
Since Xij has a finite support, the uniform convergence over i, j follows from the point convergence for
every i, j. By Lyapunov’s central limit theorem, it suffices to show that E[ψγ,k,n(Xij) | X, σn] = 0 and that
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ψγ,k,n(Xij) is independent across k given (X, σn). The equality E[ψγ,k,n(Xij) | X, σn] = 0 follows from
E[ψγ,k,n(Xij) | X, σn] = 1
n2
∑
i1,j1
(
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}
pˆ(Xij)
)
0
E
[
G†kj1,n | X, σn
]
E
[
(Gki1 ,nGkj1,n)
† | X, σn
]
E
[
(Gki1,n +Gkj1,n)
† | X, σn
]

+
1
n
∑
i1
(
1{Xi1,k = Xij}
pˆ(Xij)
)
E
[
G†ki1,n | X, σn
]
0
0
0

= 0
since E
[
RV † | X, σn
]
= 0 by definition of RV †. The conditional independence of ψγ,k,n(Xij) across k
is shown as follows. Note that ψγ,k,n(Xij) does not depend on G−k,n, so it is a function of εk, (X, σn).
Therefore, it follows from Assumptions 1 that ψγ,k,n(Xij) is independent across k given (X, σn).
Lemma 7. maxi ‖ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0)‖ = op(1) given (X, σn).
Proof. Note that
ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0) = −(1− ρ0 − ρ1) 1
n2
∑
l,j
(φ(uˆlj(θ0))− φ(ulj(θ0))) β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)ζlj .
Then
‖ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0)‖ ≤ ‖β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)‖max
l,j
|φ(uˆlj(θ0))− φ(ulj(θ0))| ‖ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)‖
≤ φ(0)‖β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)‖max
l,j
max{|uˆlj(θ0)|, |ulj(θ0)|}|uˆlj(θ0)− ulj(θ0)|‖ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)‖,
where the last inequality follows from the mean value expansion of the normal pdf φ: |φ(u1) − φ(u2)| ≤
maxu1≤u≤u2 |φ′(u)||u1 − u2| ≤ φ(0)max{|u1|, |u2|}|u1 − u2|. Since
|ulj(θ0)| ≤ (‖c(ρ0, ρ1)‖+ ‖C(ρ0, ρ1)‖‖γlj,n)‖‖β1‖+ ‖Xlj‖‖β2‖
≤ (‖c(ρ0, ρ1)‖+ 4‖C(ρ0, ρ1)‖)‖β1‖+max
x
‖x‖‖β2‖
|uˆlj(θ0)| ≤ (‖c(ρ0, ρ1)‖+ 4‖C(ρ0, ρ1)‖)‖β1‖+max
x
‖x‖‖β2‖
|uˆlj(θ0)− ulj(θ0)| = |C(ρ0, ρ1)(γˆlj − γlj,n)′β1|
≤ ‖C(ρ0, ρ1)‖‖β1‖max
lj
‖γˆlj − γlj,n‖,
it follows that
max
i
‖ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0)‖ = Op(max
lj
‖γˆlj − γlj,n)‖) = op(1).
Lemma 8. ψi(θ0) is independent across i given (X, σn).
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Proof. ψi(θ0) does not depend on G−i,n, so it is a function of (εi, X, σn). By the independence of εi across
i, it implies the statement of this lemma.
Lemma 9. mˆn(θ0) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ψi(θ0) + op(n
−1/2) given (X, σn).
Proof. Note that
mˆn(θ0)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
ψi(θ0) = (1−ρ0−ρ1) 1
n2
∑
i,j
(Φ(uˆij(θ0))− Φ(uij(θ0))− φ(uij(θ0))β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)(γˆij − γij,n)) ζij
By the second-order Taylor expansion of the normal cdf Φ,
Φ(u1) = Φ(u2) + φ(u2)(u2 − u1) +R(u1, u2)
where
|Rij | ≤ 1
2
max
u1≤u≤u2
φ′(u)|u1 − u2|2 ≤ 1
2
φ(0)max{|u1|, |u2|}|u1 − u2|2.
Since
max{|ulj(θ0)|, |uˆlj(θ0)|} ≤ (‖c(ρ0, ρ1)‖+ 4‖C(ρ0, ρ1)‖)‖β1‖+max
x
‖x‖‖β2‖
|uˆlj(θ0)− ulj(θ0)| ≤ ‖C(ρ0, ρ1)‖‖β1‖max
lj
‖γˆlj − γlj,n‖,
it follows that
‖mˆn(θ0)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
ψi(θ0)‖ = Op(max
lj
‖γˆlj − γlj,n)‖2) = Op(n−1).
Lemma 10. Conditional on (X, σn),
mˆn(θ0) = oP (1)
and
V ar(ψi(θ0) | X, σn)−1/2
√
nmˆn(θ0)→d N(0, I).
Proof. By Lemmas 5 and 8 and Lyapunov’s central limit theorem, it suffices to show E[ψi(θ0) | X, σn] = 0.
We can derive:
E[ψi(θ0) | X, σn] = 1
n
∑
j 6=i
(E[Gij,n | X, σn]− ρ0 − (1− ρ0 − ρ1)Φ(uij(θ0))) ζij
−(1− ρ0 − ρ1) 1
n2
∑
l,j
(φ(ulj(θ0))β
′
1C(ρ0, ρ1)E[ψγ,i,n(Xlj) | X, σn]) ζlj
= 0,
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because
E[Gij,n | X, σn] = ρ0 + (1 − ρ0 − ρ1)Φ(uij(θ0))
E[ψγ,i,n(Xlj) | X, σn] = 1
n2
∑
i1,j1
(
1{Xi1,j1 = Xij}
pˆ(Xij)
)
0
E[G†kj1,n | X, σn]
E[(Gki1,nGkj1,n)
† | X, σn]
E[(Gki1,n +Gkj1,n)
† | X, σn]

+
1
n
∑
i1
(
1{Xi1,k = Xij}
pˆ(Xij)
)
E[G†ki1,n | X, σn]
0
0
0

= 0.
Note that E[RV † | X, σn] = 0 by the definition of RV †.
Lemma 11. Sˆ(θ0) = V ar(ψi(θ0) | X, σn) + op(1) given (X, σn).
Proof. First, we are going to show that Sˆ(θ0) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ψ˜i(θ0)ψ˜i(θ0)
′−
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 ψ˜i(θ0)
)(
1
n
∑n
i=1 ψ˜i(θ0)
)′
+
op(1). Since
Sˆ(θ0)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)ψ˜i(θ0)
′ +
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)
)′
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0))(ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0))′
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)(ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0))′
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
(ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0))ψ˜i(θ0)′
−
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0))
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(ψˆi(θ0))
)′
−
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0))
)′
,
it follows that:∥∥∥∥∥Sˆ(θ0)− 1n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)ψ˜i(θ0)
′ +
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ˜i(θ0)
)′∥∥∥∥∥
≤ max
i
‖ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0)‖2 + 3max
i
‖ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0)‖max
i
‖ψ˜i(θ0)‖ +max
i
‖ψˆi(θ0)− ψ˜i(θ0)‖max
i
‖ψˆi(θ0)‖.
Thus it suffices to show that maxi ‖ψˆi(θ0) − ψ˜i(θ0)‖ = op(1) and maxi{‖ψ˜i(θ0)‖, ‖ψˆi(θ0)‖} = Op(1). They
are shown in Lemmas 5 and 7.
Second, we are going to show that Sˆ(θ0) = V ar(ψ˜i(θ0) | X, σn) + op(1). It suffices to show E[‖ψ˜i(θ0)‖4 |
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X, σn] <∞. By the triangle inequality,
E[‖ψ˜i(θ0)‖4 | X, σn]1/4 ≤ 1
n
∑
j 6=i
E
[
‖Gij,n‖4 | X, σn
]1/4
+
1
n2
∑
l,j
E
[∥∥∥φ(uij(θ0))β′1C(ρ0, ρ1)ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)∥∥∥4 | X, σn]1/4
≤ 1
n
∑
j 6=i
(
E[‖Gij,n‖4 | X, σn]1/4
)
+
1
n2
∑
l,j
φ(uij(θ0))β
′
1C(ρ0, ρ1)E
[∥∥∥ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)∥∥∥4 | X, σn]1/4
≤ 1 + 1
n2
∑
l,j
φ(uij(θ0))β
′
1C(ρ0, ρ1)E
[∥∥∥ψˆγ,i,n(Xlj)∥∥∥4 | X, σn]1/4
< ∞,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 5.
Third, we show that V ar(ψ˜i(θ0) | X, σn) = V ar(ψi(θ0) | X, σn). Note that ψ˜i(θ0) − ψi(θ0) is a function
of (X, σn), so the conditional variances are the same.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
As in the previous section, all the statements in this appendix are conditional on (X, σn). Theorem 3 follows
from Lemma 18.
Lemma 12. β is the unique maximizer of E [Qn(b) | X, σn], where
Qn(b) =
1
n2
∑
i,j
log
(
Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
Gij,n(1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n))1−Gij,n
)
.
Proof. Applying Jensen’s inequality to the logarithm function, we have:
E [Qn(b) | X, σn]− E [Qn(β) | X, σn]
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
(
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n) log
Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
+ (1 −Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)) log 1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
1− Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
)
≤ log
 1
n2
∑
i,j
(
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
+ (1−Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))1 −Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
1−Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
)
= 0.
It suffices to show that the equality holds only when b = β. By Jensen’s inequality, the equality holds if and
only if:
Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
= 1 for every i, j. (9)
Eq. (9) implies ((γ∗ij,n)
′, X ′ij)β = ((γ
∗
ij,n)
′, X ′ij)b for every i, j. Since {((γ∗ij,n)′, X ′ij)′ : i, j} is not contained
in any proper linear subspace of Rd+3, we have β = b.
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Lemma 13. Conditional on (X, σn),
sup
b∈B
|Qn(b)− E [Qn(b) | X, σn] | = op(1)
sup
b∈B
‖ ∂
2
∂b∂b′
Qn(b)− E
[
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qn(b) | X, σn
]
‖ = op(1).
Proof. They follow from Jenish and Prucha (2009, Proposition 1) as in the proof of Leung (2015, Theorem
2).
Lemma 14. βˆ(ρ0, ρ1)→a.s. β.
Proof. By Lemma 12 and Gallant and White (1988, Theorem 3.3), it suffices to show that
sup
b∈B
|Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)− E [Qn(b) | X, σn] | →p 0.
By Lemma 13, we need to show that supb∈B |Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)−Qn(b)| →p 0. Some calculations yield:
|Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)−Qn(b)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n2
∑
i,j
log
((
Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))
Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
)Gij,n (1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))
1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
)1−Gij,n)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
i,j
max
{∣∣∣∣log(Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
)∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣log(1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
)∣∣∣∣}
≤ max
i,j
|Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)|
min{Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij)),Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n), 1 −Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij)), 1 −Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)}
≤ max
i,j
|Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)|
min{Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n), 1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)} − |Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)|
≤ term1
term2− term1
where the second inequality follows from | log(x)| ≤ max{|x− 1|, |x− 1|/x} for x > 0 and the last equation
uses
term1 = max
i,j
|Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)|
term2 = min
i,j
min{Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n), 1−Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)}.
Since mini,j min{Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n), 1 − Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)} is bounded away from zero (because the
support of Xij is finite), the uniform convergence of Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)−Qn(b) follows from:
sup
b∈B
max
i,j
|Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))− Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)|
= (1− ρ0 − ρ1) sup
b∈B
max
i,j
|Φ(uˆij(b, ρ0, ρ1))− Φ(uij(b, ρ0, ρ1))|
= Op
(
‖max
ij
‖γˆij − γij,n‖
)
.
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Lemma 15. The minimum eigenvalue of {E
[
∂2
∂b∂b′Qn(b) | X, σn
]∣∣∣
b=β
} is bounded away from zero.
Proof. We have the following equalities:
E
[
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qn(b) | X, σn
]∣∣∣∣
b=β
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
∂
∂bΨ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
∣∣
b=β
∂
∂b′Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
∣∣
b=β
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(1 −Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
∂
∂bΨ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
∣∣
b=β
∂
∂b′Ψ(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)
∣∣
b=β
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(1 −Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))
=
(1− ρ0 − ρ1)2
n2
∑
i,j
φ((Z∗ij,n)
′β0)
2
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(1− Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))Z
∗
ij,n(Z
∗
ij,n)
′.
Note that the minimum eigenvalue of
∑
i,j Z
∗
ij,n(Z
∗
ij,n)
′ is bounded away from zero. Since
φ((Z∗ij,n)
′β0)
2
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(1−Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))
is bounded from zero uniformly over i, j, n, the minimum eigenvalue of
∑
i,j
φ((Z∗ij,n)
′β0)
2
Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(1−Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))Z
∗
ij,n(Z
∗
ij,n)
′
is bounded away from zero.
Lemma 16. supb∈B
∥∥∥E [ ∂2∂b∂b′Qn(b) | X, σn]− ∂2∂b∂b′ Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)∥∥∥ = op(1) given (X, σn).
Proof. By Lemma 13, we need to show that
sup
b∈B
∥∥∥∥ ∂2∂b∂b′ Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)− ∂2∂b∂b′Qn(b)
∥∥∥∥ = op(1),
that is,
sup
b∈B
∥∥∥∥u′( ∂2∂b∂b′ Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)− ∂2∂b∂b′Qn(b)
)∥∥∥∥ = op(1) for every vector u.
Since
u′
(
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)− ∂
2
∂b∂b′
Qn(b)
)
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
Gij,nu
′
(
∂
∂b′
(C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n))
)
− 1
n2
∑
i,j
u′
(
∂
∂b′
(C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n))
)
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
Gij,n
∂
∂b′
(u′C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))− u′C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n))
− 1
n2
∑
i,j
∂
∂b′
(u′C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))− u′C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n)),
28
we have:∥∥∥∥u′( ∂2∂b∂b′ Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)− ∂2∂b∂b′Qn(b)
)∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1n2 ∑
i,j
∥∥∥∥ ∂∂b′ (u′C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))− u′C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n))
∥∥∥∥
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
∥∥∥∥ ∂∂b′ (u′C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))− u′C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γij,n))
∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
n2
∑
i,j
sup
γˇij
∥∥∥∥∥ ∂2∂b∂γˇ′iju′C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˇij)
∥∥∥∥∥ ‖γˆ(Xij)− γij,n‖
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
sup
γˇij
∥∥∥∥∥ ∂2∂b∂γˇ′ij u′C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˇij)
∥∥∥∥∥ ‖γˆ(Xij)− γij,n‖
≤ sup
i,j
sup
γˇij
∥∥∥∥∥ ∂2∂b∂γˇ′iju′C1(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˇij)
∥∥∥∥∥ supi,j ‖γˆ(Xij)− γij,n‖
+sup
i,j
sup
γˇij
∥∥∥∥∥ ∂2∂b∂γˇ′ij u′C2(b, ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˇij)
∥∥∥∥∥ supi,j ‖γˆ(Xij)− γij,n‖.
Since ∂
2
∂b∂γˇ′
ij
u′C1 and
∂2
∂b∂γˇ′
ij
u′C2 have bounded supports, we have:
sup
b∈B
∥∥∥∥u′( ∂2∂b∂b′ Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)− ∂2∂b∂b′Qn(b)
)∥∥∥∥ = Op (sup
i,j
‖γˆ(Xij)− γij,n‖
)
= op(1).
Lemma 17.
√
nE
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n | X, σn
]−1/2
E
[
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qn(b) | X, σn
]∣∣∣∣
b=β
(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1)−β)→d N(0, I) given (X, σn).
Proof. By Lemma 14, 15, 16 and Gallant and White (1988, Theorem 5.1), it suffices to prove the following
statements:
• E
[
∂2
∂b∂b′Qn(b) | X, σn
]∣∣∣
b=β
and E
[
1
n
∑n
k=1 ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n
]
are O(1);
• E
[
∂2
∂b∂b′Qn(b) | X, σn
]
is continuous in b ∈ B uniformly in n; and
•
√
nE
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n | X, σn
]−1/2
∂
∂b
Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)
∣∣∣∣
b=β
→d N(0, I) (10)
The first two statements follow from the error being normally distributed.
Before proving Eq. (10), we will show that
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(γˆij − γij,n) = op(n−1/2). (11)
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Note that:
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(γˆij − γij,n)
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n) 1
n
∑
k
ψγ,k,n(Xij)
=
1
n2
∑
i,k
term(i, k),
where:
term(i, k) =
1
n
∑
j
(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)ψγ,k,n(Xij).
We will demonstrate the L2 convergence of 1n2
∑
i,k term(i, k). Regarding the expectation of
1
n2
∑
i,k term(i, k),
we have
E
 1
n2
∑
i,k
term(i, k) | X, σn

=
1
n2
∑
i6=k
1
n
∑
j
E [(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)ψγ,k,n(Xij) | X, σn]
+
1
n2
∑
i
1
n
∑
j
E [(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)ψγ,i,n(Xij) | X, σn]
=
1
n2
∑
i6=k
1
n
∑
j
E [(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn]) | X, σn]D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)E [ψγ,k,n(Xij) | X, σn]
+
1
n2
∑
i
1
n
∑
j
E [(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)ψγ,i,n(Xij) | X, σn]
=
1
n2
∑
i
1
n
∑
j
E [(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn])D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)ψγ,i,n(Xij) | X, σn]
= O(n−1).
where the second equality comes from the independence of {Gij,n : j} across i, the third equality follows
from E [(Gij,n − E [Gij,n | X, σn]) | X, σn] = 0, and the last equality follows because Gij,n, D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n),
and ψγ,i,n(Xij) are bounded. Regarding the variance of
1
n2
∑
i,k term(i, k), we use:
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn) = 0 if k2 6= i1, k1, i2 (12)
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn) = 0 if k1 6= i1, k2, i2 (13)
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k1) | X, σn) = 0 if i1 6= k1, i2, (14)
where they result from the fact that Gij,n−E [Gij,n | X, σn] and ψγ,k,n(Xij) are mean-zero and independent
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across (i, k). We have:
V ar
 1
n2
∑
i,k
term(i, k) | X, σn
 = 1
n4
∑
(i1,k1,i2,k2)
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn)
=
1
n4
∑
(i1,k1,i2)
∑
k2=i1,k1,i2
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn)
=
1
n4
∑
(i1,i2)
∑
k2=i1,i2
∑
k1
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn)
+
1
n4
∑
(k1,i2)
∑
i1
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k1) | X, σn)
=
1
n4
∑
(i1,i2)
∑
k2=i1,i2
∑
k1=i1,i2
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn)
+
1
n4
∑
(k1,i2)
∑
i1=k1,i2
Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k1) | X, σn)
≤ 6
n2
max
(i1,k1,i2,k2)
|Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn) |
= O(n−2),
where the third equality uses Eq.(12), the fifth equality uses Eq.(13) and Eq.(14), and the last equality
follows from sup(i1,k1,i2,k2) |Cov (term(i1, k1), term(i2, k2) | X, σn)| = O(1).
Now we show that Eq. (11) implies Eq. (10). The first-order Taylor expansions yield
sup
i,j
‖C1(θ0, Xij , γˆij)−C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(γˆij − γij,n)‖ = op
(
sup
i,j
‖γˆij − γij,n‖
)
sup
i,j
‖C2(θ0, Xij , γˆij)−C2(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D2(θ0, Xij , γij,n)(γˆij − γij,n)‖ = op
(
sup
i,j
‖γˆij − γij,n‖
)
,
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and
∂
∂b
Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)
∣∣∣∣
b=β
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n −Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n (C1(θ0, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n))− (C2(θ0, Xij , γˆ(Xij))−C2(θ0, Xij , γij,n)))
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n −Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,nD1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D2(θ0, Xij , γij,n)) (γˆij − γij,n) + op(n−1/2)
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n −Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
(E [Gij,n | X, σn]D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D2(θ0, Xij , γij,n)) (γˆij − γij,n) + op(n−1/2)
=
1
n2
∑
i,j
(Gij,n −Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n))C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)
+
1
n2
∑
i,j
(E [Gij,n | X, σn]D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D2(θ0, Xij , γij,n)) 1
n
∑
k
ψγ,k,n(Xij) + op(n
−1/2)
=
1
n
∑
k
ψQ,k,n + op(n
−1/2),
where the third equality uses Eq. (11). We can apply Lyapunovs central limit theorem to uniformly-bounded
random variables ψQ,k,n, and we have Eq. (10).
Lemma 18.
√
nÂV (ρ0, ρ1)
−1/2(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1)− β)→d N(0, I) given (X, σn).
Proof. By Lemma 17, it is sufficient to show that
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qˆn(b, ρ0, ρ1)
∣∣∣∣
b=βˆ(ρ0,ρ1)
− E
[
∂2
∂b∂b′
Qn(b) | X, σn
]∣∣∣∣
b=β
= op(1)
1
n
n∑
k=1
ψˆQ,k,n(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1)ψˆQ,k,n(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1)
′ − E
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n | X, σn
]
= op(1).
The first statement follows from Lemma 16. For the rest of the proof, we will show the second statement.
First, we show that
1
n
n∑
k=1
ψˆQ,k,n(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1)ψˆQ,k,n(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1)
′ − 1
n
n∑
k=1
ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n = op(1).
Since ψQ,k,n is uniformly bounded, it suffices to show that maxk ‖ψˆQ,k,n(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1)−ψQ,k,n‖ = op(1).
32
This convergence follows from:
max
i,j,k
∥∥∥ψγ,k,n(Xij)− ψˆγ,k,n(Xij)∥∥∥ = op(1)
max
i,j
∥∥∥Ψ(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−Ψ(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))∥∥∥ = op(1)
max
i,j
∥∥∥C1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−C1(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xkj))∥∥∥ = op(1)
max
i,j
∥∥∥D1(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D1(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))∥∥∥ = op(1)
max
i,j
∥∥∥D2(θ0, Xij , γij,n)−D2(βˆ(ρ0, ρ1), ρ0, ρ1, Xij , γˆ(Xij))∥∥∥ = op(1).
Note that the uniform convergence over (i, j, k) is equivalent to the pointwise convergence, since Xij has a
finite support.
Then, we can obtain 1n
∑n
k=1 ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n − E
[
1
n
∑n
k=1 ψQ,k,nψ
′
Q,k,n | X, σn
]
= op(1), by applying the
weak law of large numbers to uniformly-bounded random variables ψQ,k,n.
B Semiparametric Identification Analysis
Given P ∈ P , we will characterize the identified set in the semiparametric model.
Definition 2. For each distribution P ∈ P, the identified set ΘI,SP (P ) is defined as the set of all θ =
(b, r0, r1) in Θ for which there is some joint distribution P
∗ ∈ P∗ such that Condition 1, 2(ii), and 3 holds,
and that the distribution of (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n) induced from P
∗ is equal to P .
Theorem 4. Given P ∈ P, ΘI,SP (P ) is equal to the set of θ ∈ Θ satisfying the following statements a.s.
for some r0, r1 ≥ 0 such that r0 + r1 < 1 and some weakly increasing and right-continuous function Λ:
r0 ≤ EP [Gij,n | Zij,n] and r1 ≤ EP [1−Gij,n | Zij,n] (15)
EP [Gij,n | Zij,n] = Λ
(
(c(r0, r1) + γ
′
ij,nC(r0, r1))
′b1 +X
′
ijb2
)
. (16)
Proof. First, we will show that every element θ of ΘI,SP (P ) satisfies the conditions in (15)-(16). Let (r0, r1)
denote the misclassification probabilities. Denote by Λ∗ the cdf of −εij and define Λ(v) = r0 + (1 − r0 −
r1)Λ
∗(v). By Lemma 2 and 3:
EP∗ [Gij,n | Zij,n] = r0 + (1− r0 − r1)EP∗
[
G∗ij,n | Zij,n
]
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Λ∗((c(r0, r1) + γ′ij,nC(r0, r1))′b1 +X ′ijb2),
and we have the condition (16). Note that Λ is weakly increasing and right-continuous, because Λ∗ is weakly
increasing and right-continuous. The two inequalities in (15) are shown as follows:
EP∗ [Gij,n | Zij,n] = r0 + (1 − r0 − r1)EP∗
[
G∗ij,n | Zij,n
] ≥ r0
EP∗ [1−Gij,n | Zij,n] = r1 + (1 − r0 − r1)EP∗
[
1−G∗ij,n | Zij,n
] ≥ r1,
where the inequalities follow from 1− r0 − r1 ≥ 0.
Now, the rest of the proof will show that every element θ ∈ Θ satisfying (15)-(16), belongs to ΘI,SP (P ).
By the condition (16) as well as Condition (15), there is a weakly increasing and right-continuous function
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Λ : R→ [r0, 1− r1] such that:
EP [Gij,n | Zij,n] = Λ
(
(c(r0, r1) + γ
′
ij,nC(r0, r1))
′b1 +X
′
ijb2
)
. (17)
Denote by Λ∗ the cdf satisfying Λ(v) = r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Λ∗(v).
Define the joint distribution P ∗ in the following way. Define the cdf of εij such that Λ
∗ is the cdf of −εij .
The conditional distribution of (γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij) given εij is
P ∗((γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij) ∈ B | εij) = P ((γij,n, c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n, Xij) ∈ B) (18)
for all the measurable sets B. The conditional distribution of G∗ij,n given (γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij , εij) is:
P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | γij,n, γ∗ij,n, Xij , εij) = 1{(Z∗ij,n)′b+ εij ≥ 0}. (19)
The conditional distribution of Gij,n given (G
∗
ij,n, γij,n, γ
∗
ij,n, Xij , εij) is:
P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | G∗ij,n, γij,n, γ∗ij,n, Xij , εij) =
r0 if G∗ij,n = 01− r1 if G∗ij,n = 1. (20)
Note that (P ∗, θ) satisfies Conditions 1(ii), 2 and 3, because Condition 1(ii) follows from Eq. (18),
Condition 2 follows from Eq. (19), Condition 3(i) follows from Eq. (19) and (20), and Condition 3(ii) follows
from Eq. (18).
To conclude this proof, we now show that the distribution of (Gij,n, Xij , γij,n) induced from P
∗ is equal
to P . The distribution of (Xij , γij,n) induced from P
∗ is equal to that from P , by Eq. (18). The equality of
P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n) = P (Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n) a.s. under P ∗ is shown as follows. Note that
γ∗ij,n = c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n a.s. under P
∗ (21)
Then
P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n) = P ∗(Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0P
∗(G∗ij,n = 0 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n) + (1− r1)P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)EP∗ [P ∗(G∗ij,n = 1 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n, εij) | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n]
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)P ∗((Z∗ij,n)′b+ εij ≥ 0 | Zij,n, γ∗ij,n)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Λ∗((Z∗ij,n)′b)
= r0 + (1− r0 − r1)Λ∗((c(r0, r1) + C(r0, r1)γij,n)′b1 +X ′ijb2)
= P (Gij,n = 1 | Zij,n),
where the first and seventh equalities follow from Eq. (21), the second follows from Eq. (20), the fifth follows
from Eq. (19), and the last follows from Eq. (17).
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